PhD Candidate in Economics at the Helsinki GSE
I am a PhD candidate at the Helsinki Graduate School of Economics (Helsinki GSE). My research interests are in information economics and game theory. I work on questions related to auctions and mechanism design.
Currently, I am continuing my postdoctoral research at the Yale University, Cowles Foundation. In 2022–2023, I will be a postdoctoral fellow at MIT. I am participating in the 2023-2024 academic job market. See you there!
Tel.: +1(203) 285-7465
Office: 28 Hillhouse Ave, Room B21, Yale
Yale University, Cowles Foundation
30 Hillhouse Avenue, P.O. Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281, USA
Abstract: We consider a principal-agent model in which the principal can monitor and punish the agent with a fine if the agent is caught being untruthful. To reduce the probability of being verified, the agent can engage in costly avoidance. We design the optimal regulatory policies with and without avoidance. The optimal mechanism with enforcement allocates the object more often than the optimal mechanism without enforcement. Moreover, enforcement increases the expected transfers to the principal. Avoidance has two implications to the optimal regulatory mechanism: (i) the expected optimal transfers to the principal decrease and (ii) the principal allocates the object to a smaller share of types. If the latter effect dominates the former, it is possible that the agent's capability to engage in avoidance is disadvantageous not only for the principal, but also for the agent ex ante.